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The Ducks Stop Here? 
The Environmental Challenge to Federalism 
Jonathan H. 
In Solid Waste Association of Northern Cook County v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers ("SWANCC"L the Supre1ne Court 
considered whether federal regulatory authority reaches iso-
lated wetlands and ponds due to the potential presence of mi-
gratory birds. In such an expansive view federal 
authority, the Court majority underlined its devotion to fed-
eralism, despite the dissent's c01nplaint that the decision 
would frustrate environmental protection. 
This paper argues that SWANNC is not an to en-
vironnwntal protection. There is little reason to that 
interstate competition amongst states will produce a "race 
to the bottom" in environmental regulation today, if it ever 
did. presence interstate can, in certain 
,., ... "L''l"'-<i,,"u.L.<~vo, justify federal environmental regulation. How-
the presence such externalities is 
and the 
greater than 
"vetlands represent public that are un-
states, intervention may be justified. 
not mean federal regulation. 
such as econo1nic incentives or the direct provision 
ronn1ental are In 
for the argument that interstate externalities 
ture the Lopez 
*Assistant Professor, Western Reserve University School of Law. Thanks to 
Michael Michael Bruce Kobayashi, Nelson Lund, Brent Mcintosh, 
drew Morriss, Larry Ribstcin, Todd Zywicki, and an anonymous referee for their com-
ments and critiques. 
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The SWANCC majority limited federal power because Con-
failed to articulate its intent to stretch federal regula-
tory authority to reach isolated waters. Federal intrusions 
into traditional state functions of must be 
clearly stated to be upheld, while of the CWA 
was ambiguous. There are other 
as the Endangered '-'IJ~-'""-"/cJ 
far-reaching federal authority with 
In cases, the Court. will need to the argwnent.s 
federalism head-on to preserve inter-jurisdictional 
competition amongst the states. 
INTRODUCTION 
There are an estimated 105.5 million acres of wetlands in the United 
States. lands range from mangroves and salt marshes to small 
ponds, mudflats and prairie potholes, the vast majority of which are 
located on private lands. 2 Federal regulations adopted in the 1970s 
limit the use and development of designated wetlands throughout 
the nation. At their outer limit, these regulations purport to control 
nearly any activity that could result in the "pollution" of wetlands. 
rules have been controversial since their inception. Environ-
mental activists question their effectiveness while landowners com-
plain of the costs of compliance. There have even been questions 
whether federal wetland regulations exceed the constitutional lim-
its on federal power. 
In Solid Waste Association of Northern Cook County v. U. 
Corps of Engineers(" SWANCC"), the Supreme Court consid-
ered whether federal regulatory authority reaches isolated wetlands 
and ponds due to the potential presence of migratory birds. Petition-
ers, a consortium of local governments, sought to have such regula-
1 Thomas E. Dahl, Status and Trends of Wetlands in the Coterminous United 
9 (US Fish Wildlife Service, 2000). The term "wetlands" is used 
in this paper to include lands defined such by one of several federal 
agencies that operate wetlands programs, in addition to other, waters 
which might not otherwise be considered wetlands by or all of these agencies. 
Jon Kusler, Wetlands Delineation: An of Environ-
(Mar 1992l. 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers the authority to regulate "walk-
hll·nr·tn"'" or driving a vehicle through wetland/1 though such activities 
Fed Reg 45008, 45020 1993L 
'This argument made at length in Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Waterfowl, and 
the l'v1enac:e of Mr. Wilson: Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and the Limits of Fed-
eral Wetland Regulation Envtl L l ( 1999), from which portions of this article 
draw. 
121 S Ct 67.S (2001). 
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tion of isolated wetlands declared unconstitutional. Voting 5-4, the 
Court rejected the expansive view of federal authority, but without 
reaching the constitutional question. Instead, the Court held that, 
''.::"~"''""" the Clean Water Act (CWA) did not contain a clear indica-
tion that Congress sought to reach outennost limits of its enu-
merated powers/ the statute would not be construed to authorize 
the regulation of isolated, intrastate waters. 
With this decision1 the Court's majority continued the revival of 
federalism exemplified by recent cases such as United States v. Lo-
and United States v. Morrison. 7 Those cases held that Congress 
had exceeded the enumerated powers granted by the Constitution by 
attempting to regulate non-economic intrastate activities. SWANCC 
su~~gested, without holding, that Congress might also those 
powers if it sought to regulate isolated waters within a state. By im-
posing a clear-state1nent requiren1ent on Congress, the Court effec-
tively Inade it n1ore difficult for Congress to test the limits of its 
authority in the area of environmental regulation.H Given that the ex-
act limits of constitutional authority are not easy to specify, 
and that congressional intent is not always clear, five Justices have 
decided that the risks of impeding Congress' authorized regulatory 
activity are outweighed by the need to protect the constitutional 
boundaries on congressional power. 
The dissent argued that the n1ajority ignored Congress' clear in-
tent and, in the process, exposed millions of acres of wetlands to 
destruction. Without challenging the principle that the Constitu-
tion limits Congress' authority, the dissent rnaintained that the ex-
istence of" externalities" justifies federal regulation in certain fields, 
such as environn1ental protection, that otherwise might lie beyond 
r..-...--..c.cc· grasp. Underlying the dissent's position is the view that 
expansJNe federal regulation is necessary for environmental protec-
tion. Specifically, without federal regulation, wildlife habitat will be 
irretrievably lost and Americans again will be exposed to "toxic wa-
ter."9 This view has been echoed in commentary. 10 
This article argues that the dissent's concerns are theoretically 
and empirically unfounded. There is little reason to believe that in-
terstate competition states will produce 
Sl4 549 (1995). 
529 US S9R (20001. 
In the prior term, the Court unanimously 
quirement on efforts to ""t-hr"·'h' over crime/ Tones v 
S29 US H48 (2000) (overturning conviction under arson statute 
due to insufficient neXUS With interstate vU111111'-lvvj 
Svv:!\NCC, 121 Ct <lB4 dissenting). 
For Vermont Law Patrick Peln"ntPClll 
decision dealt the "nation1s water quality goals'' a "major 
Ow Wetland Donnnoe,~, Natl L J 26, 200 l \ at A 18. 
that SWANCC 
Patrick Parenteau, 
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bottom" in environmental regulation today, if it ever did. Interstate 
competition is not likely to result in suboptimal environmental pro-
tection, at least when compared with the alternative of federal regu-
lation. States will make trade-offs between environmental 
tion and other goals that are most consistent with the values of the 
people in those states. Moreover, interjurisdictional competition will 
promote the discovery of optimal environmental protection strate-
gies. Although the presence of interstate externalities might son1e-
times justify federal environmental regulation, such externalities 
often are overstated, and the costs of addressing such externalities 
through federal regulation may well exceed the benefits of main-
taining state primacy Even if federal intervention is justified be-
cause states undersupply wetlands, this need not mean federal regu-
lation, as distinguished from economic incentives or the direct 
provision of environmental goods. In short, there is little for 
the argument that interstate externalities justify a departure from 
the approach to federalism that is now being applied in areas other 
than environmental regulation. 
The SWANCC majority articulated its federalism rationale with-
out addressing environmental concerns. The opinion rested on the 
broad federalism principles underlying the Court's decisions in Lo-
pez, Morrison, and other recent federalism cases. The interpretive 
canon employed in this case serves the same purpose as the consti-
tutional doctrine itself. This clear-statement rule, however, will not 
prevent the Court from having to face questions about the bound-
aries of congressional authority to impose environmental regula-
tions. There are other environn1ental statutes, such as the Endan-
gered Species Act, which assert extremely far-reaching federal 
authority with far less ambiguity than the Clean Water Act. The 
Court eventually will have to confront the constitutional issue that 
it avoided in SWANCC, as well as the race-to-the-bottom arguments 
offered by the SWANCC dissent. When that happens, the Court 
should receive such arguments with considerable skepticism. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S FEDERALISM 
Scarcely two decades ago/ the principles of federalism to be 
a relic in American constitutional law. The New Deal era had seen 
a dramatic repudiation of the Supreme Court's previous efforts to 
enforce limits on the scope of Congress' power to com-
merce, and a later series of decisions had rejected efforts to limit 
the national govcrnn1ent's power over the states themselves. 11 
The most important Authority, 
469 us ( 
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cases "appeared to have signaled the end of judicial federalism and 
the demise of the Tenth Amendment as a constitutional limit on 
Congress' Commerce Clause powers." Yet reports of federalism's 
demise were premature. During the 1990s, Supreme Court re-
versed course. Case by case, a slim majority has begun to restore 
the constitutional structure of "dual and enumerated 
powers. Continuation of this trend could dramatically redefine the 
federal government's role in addressing domestic problems, not least 
in environmental affairs. 
A. The Doctrine 
The Supreme Court's recent federalism cases can be loosely divided 
into two groups: enumerated powers cases and state sovereignty 
cases. Those in the first group, which are more important for the 
subject at hand, focus on whether a federal statute constitutes a 
proper exercise of a power delegated to Congress by the Constitu-
tion. In these cases, the Court's majority has sought to enforce the 
principle that the federal government is one of discrete and limited 
powers. In United States v. Morrison, for example, the Supreme 
Court struck down a statute that provided a federal civil remedy for 
the victin1s of gender-motivated violence against women, conclud-
ing that Congress did not have authority to create such a remedy 
under the Interstate Commerce Clause 18 or under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Robert H. Freilich and David G. Richardson, Returning 
Federalism. Framing a New Tenth Amendment United 
Urb Law ( 
There have been notable exceptions to this 
'-'f:><UU.Lu6 federal preemption of state law. for ,_..,., .... 1.n._, 
529 US 861 (holding that federal auto 
existence of savings clause). 
in 
American Honda 
rules preempt state 
14 This is in fuller detail in Comment, The of Printz: The 
Revival of Federalism and Its Implications for Environmental Law, 6 Geo Mason L 
Rev 573 (1998). 
Not all cases fall neatly into one category or the other, and commentators 
have characterized the somewhat differently. for example, Michael J. Ger-
hardt, Environmental Regulation in Post-Lopez World: Some Questions 
and 30 Envtl L Rep 10980 (2000) (categorizing state immunity 
enumerated powers cases under the 14th Amendment). 
529 us 598 (2000). 
17 42 usc § 13981. 
US Canst, Art I, 8, cl ("The Congress shall have Power . . To regulate 
Commerce w1th foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes.n) 
US Const, Amend XIV, ~ ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by 
appropriate the provisions of this article."). This provision refers to the 
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second group of cases deals directly with incidents of state 
sovereignty protected by the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. In 
these cases, the Court has considered the extent to which states are 
immune to federal government efforts to influence or command 
state resources and authority. The Court has invalidated federal stat-
utes that sought to commandeer the use of state officials to imple-
ment a federal program, or that required a state legislature to enact 
a federally prescribed law. The Court also has limited Congress' 
power to abrogate state sovereign in1munity in federal or state court. 
All of these cases stress the importance of maintaining an appro-
priate balance between the state and federal sovereigns, and they 
assume that Congress cannot and should not be trusted to restrain 
itself from exceeding the proper scope of its own authority. 
While both sets of cases have significant implications for environ-
mental protection, the enumerated powers cases are particularly im-
portant. For decades, there seemed to be nothing beyond the federal 
government's reach under the Commerce Clause. That changed in 
1995 with United States v. Lopez, where the Court invalidated the 
Gun-Free School Zones Act, which made it illegal to possess a fire-
arm within 1,000 feet of a school. Regulation of guns near schools, 
a five justice majority declared, was not within any of the three 
broad categories of activity the Commerce Clause empowers Con-
gress to regulate: 1) the use of the channels of interstate commerce; 
2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things 
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee that no state shall deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process or deny any person equal protection of the laws. 
Printz v United 521 US 898 ( 1997) (holding that Congress may not com-
pel state law enforcement officials to assist in implementing a federal gun control 
program!; New Yorl< v United 505 US 144 (holding that Congress may not 
compel state legislatures to adopt a specified nuclear waste regulatory program). 
See, for Board of Trustees v 121 S Ct 955 (2001) (without suf-
ficient findings, sovereign immunity bars private suits against states 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimel Florida Bd of Regents, 528 US 
62 (2000l (sovereign immunity bars private suits against states under the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act); Alden v Maine, 527 US 706 (1999) (sovereign im-
munity protects states from private suits under the Fair Labor Standards Act in state 
College Savings Rank v Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed Expense Bd, 527 
US 666 ( 1999) (Trademark Remedy Clarification Act not state sovereign 
immunityh of Florida v Florida, 7 US 44 (1996) {Congress lacks 
power under Article I to abrogate state sovereign immunity). 
The beginning of this period marked by v 
Corp 301 US 1 Congress's power to regulate terms of employment 
and labor relations agreements part of its commerce power under the National 
Labor Relations Act). 
514 US S49 (1995). 
18 usc 
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in interstate commercei and 3) those activities that "substantially 
affect" interstate cmnmerce. 
The first two prongs of this Lopez framework are reasonably 
straightforward. If something is sold or used in interstate commerce, 
it can be regulated. Less obvious is what intrastate activities are sub-
ject to federal regulation because they "substantially affect" inter-
state cmnmerce. Virtually all kinds of activity have the potential 
substantially to affect interstate commerce through their indirect 
effects. Thus, for example, the widespread presence of guns in schools 
could adversely affect the educational environment, thus reducing 
the future productivity of the students and thereby eventually iin-
pacting interstate commerce. Yet as the Lopez Court recognized, 
were the Court to accept this argument, it would be "hard pressed 
to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power 
to regulate. 
The to understanding the "substantial affects" test is that it 
examines the comn1ercial nature of the activity as well as the activi-
ty's effect on commerce. Just because insomnia has a significant na-
tional economic impact, it does not follow that the Commerce 
Clause authorizes Congress to regulate our sleeping habits. Rather, 
the question is whether the activity to be regulated is itself related 
to 111 commerce/ or any sort of economic enterprise" or whether the 
regulation is "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic 
activitYt in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless 
the intrastate activity were regulated. In other words, the activity 
n1ust be "economic in nature" for the enactment to pass muster. 
Thus, the regulation of industrial mining activity is a permissible 
regulation of commerce, as is a national price maintenance regime 
for agricultural products.31 Federal regulation of domestic violence 
or gun possession near schools, however, is not regulable merely be-
cause these activities Inay have a significant economic effect. While 
refusing to adopt a" categorical rule," the Morrison Court noted that 
Sl4USat 
169 F3d 8201 Cir 19991 
and $107.S billion per 
aff' d sub nom 
Virgini£1 Mining 4S2 US 264 ( 1981) 
(upholding the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act). 
Wickard 31 US 111 1942) (forbidding production of agricultural 
products self-use national of the Agricultural Adjust-
Act ot 19381. 
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{{thus far in our Nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce 
...__,.._,:Luc·~ regulation of intrastate activity where that is 
economic in nature. 
Pervading the Supreme Court's federalist jurisprudence is the idea 
that some governmental functions are provided by the federal 
government, while the rest should be performed at the state and 
local As Justice O'Connor noted in New York v. United States, 
"[i]f a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth 
Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to 
the States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by 
the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution 
has not conferred on Congress. 
State and federal governments each have areas in which they spe-
cialize. According to Hamilton: 
The administration of private justice between the citizens of 
the same State, the supervision of agriculture and of other con-
cerns of a similar nature, all those things, in short, which are 
proper to be provided for by local legislation, can never be de-
sirable cares of a general jurisdiction.34 
Concern with preserving to the states some portion of their tradi-
tional jurisdiction is a common refrain in the Supreme Court's re-
cent cases. In for example, the Court noted that both crimi-
nal law and education were traditional functions of state and local 
governments, along with family law.35 In 1982 the Supreme Court 
declared regulation of land use a "quintessential state activity."·16 
To preserve the system of dual sovereignty, the courts must police 
each sovereign's boundaries. The federal government must be con-
strained to operate within its constitutionally prescribed limits, 
while states are prevented from disrupting national1narkets. Other-
wise, were "the Federal Government to take over the regulation of 
entire areas of traditional state concern, having nothing to do with 
the regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries between the 
spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political re-
sponsibility would become illusory." 17 
Morrison, US at 609 added). 
York, 505 US 156. 
The Federalist No. I 7, at 1S6 Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick cd 1987). 
14 US at S61 n3 (11 Under our federal system, the 'States primary 
ut:r:tnnlg and the criminal law. v Isaac, 456 
US 1071 12R ( id at 564-6S (noting that law enforcement/ education and family 
law are matters traditionally left to the id at S80 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(uit well established that education a traditional concern of the citing 
us 104 (1968)). 
ML~:sisi~ip[)i, 456 US 742, 768 n30 ( 
concurring). 
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B. The Rationale 
Both the state sovereignty and enumerated powers strands of the 
Court's federalism jurisprudence are grounded in the notion "dual 
sovereignty." The division of authority between the federal and state 
governments is even n1ore fundamental than the separation of pow-
ers among the branches of the federal government. As the Court 
explained in Gregory · "Just as the separation and inde-
pendence the coordinate branches of Federal Governtnent serve 
to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, 
a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Gov-
ernment will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either 
front." 3 H Moreover, a decentralized federal system produces govern-
ment that is '1more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous 
society" and "more responsive by putting States in competition for 
a mobile citizenry." 39 
Perhaps the strongest argument for reserving substantial power 
to the states is that local tastes, conditions, and concerns will vary 
from place to place. Demographic variation, localized culture, dif-
fering geography; and varied economic strengths mean that one-size-
fits-all approaches to policy too often fit nobody. Leaving substantial 
power in the hands of state and local governments helps those gov-
ernmental units do a better job of matching local government poli-
cies with the tastes and preferences of local citizens than a national 
government could do. At the same time, decentralization enables a 
mobile citizenry to move to those areas where government policies 
(and other factors) are most in line with their own preferences. 
Consider the following example suggested by Michael McCon-
nelL A nation is made up of two states/ A and B. Each state has 
100 70 percent of those in State A, and 40 of those 
in State B, favor banning smoking in public buildings. The re-
Inaining residents of each state oppose the ban. If a decision is 1nade 
by popular vote at the national level, smoking in public buildings is 
banned by a vote of 110 to 90. However, if each state decides its own 
smoking policy by majority vote, the ban passes in State A, 70-30, 
but fails in State B, 40-60. Thus, 130 of the 200 residents are satis-
fied with the policy choice. The division of the nation into two 
states results in the satisfaction of 20 n1ore people than would have 
occurred were policy n1ade at the national leveL If people are mo-
bile, even more people could be satisfied by moving to the state 
where the policy matches their personal preference. Assuming that 
501 us 452, 458 ( 1991 ). 
Id at 
Michael W McConnell, 
L Rev 14841 1494 (1987). 
U Chi 
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as few as ten percent of people will move from a state with a disfa-
vored policy to a state with a favored policy increases the number of 
satisfied citizens to 13 7 of 200. 
In the real world, of course, people seldom if ever their 
state of residence solely because of relatively trivial policy issues 
like the one in this hypotheticaL But they may relocate in response 
to more significant policy choices, and there may be correlations 
among various preferences. Thus, for example, the same people who 
object to smoking in public buildings may share numerous other 
preferences, while those who favor smoking in public buildings may 
share contrary preferences among then1selves. As a result, differing 
policy choices by state governments can have powerful effects at 
the margin. 41 
This dynamic-states' ability to adopt policies in line with local 
r"''""'""" .... ~"''" .. """'"'' and citizens' ability to move to states with policies they 
prefer-leads to the second argument for federalist syste1n: inter-
jurisdictional competition. States compete for citizens by offering 
differing mixes of taxes, services, and regulations. This reinforces 
heterogeneity of tastes across states and homogeneity of tastes within 
states. Thus, public policy will vary from state to state, particularly 
in areas where there is no clearly optimal policy choice. Moreover, 
dispersing power and authority away from the central government 
and removing barriers to interstate competition constrain govern-
ment's ability to maintain rent-seeking policies. 
The decentralization of authority also encourages state experimen-
tation. In Justice Brandeis' famous words: "It is one of the happy inci-
dents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its 
citizens choose, serve as a laboratoryi and try novel social and eco-
nomic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." 44 Such 
experimentation results from the possibility of competition among 
jurisdictions, just as it does from competition between buyers and 
Sec, for example, Margaret F. Brinig & F H. BuckleYr The Market for Deadbeats. 
25 J Leg Stud 201, 209-lO (1996) that higher welfare payouts 
and correlated with immigration and significantly and corre-
lated with emigration); F. H. Margaret F. Brinig, Welfare Magnets. 
for the Top, Sup Ct Econ Rev 141, 169 (1997) (evidence that states 
generous welfare benefits to attract immigrants who 
to support the dominant coalition). 
Charles M. Tiebout, of Local 
Pol Econ 416, 422 ( 1956!. 
Barry R. Weingast, The LL'.'l""'lllL 
Economic 
Liebmann, 
Steven G. Calahresi, 
ated Powers' In Defense of United States 
Jonathan H. Adler 215 
sellers in the marketplace. States essentially sell places to live, work, 
and produce goods, and will respond to market pressures. When the 
federal government intrudes into areas of traditional state concern, 
it 1'forecloses the States from experimenting and their own 
judgment in an area to which States lay claiin by right of history 
and expertise, and it does so by regulating an activity beyond the 
realm of commerce in the ordinary and usual sense of that term. 
It is, of course, true that decentralization is not an entirely un-
mixed blessing. Most importantly in the present context, the benefits 
of decentralization cannot easily be disentangled from the structural 
incentives it creates for the production of negative externalities and 
free riding. Sorting out these costs and benefits is among the n1ost 
difficult and important questions in the field of environmental regu-
lation, and it provided the main basis for the dispute between the 
majority and the dissent in SWANCC. 
II. SWANCC v. CORPS OF ENGINEERS 
In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U. S. Army 
Corps of Engineers ("SWANCC"), the Court confronted the scope 
of federal regulatory authority over wetlands and other "waters of 
the United States" under the Clean Water Act ("CWA").47 Prior to 
SWANCC, the Supreme Court had never struck down a federal envi-
ronmental enactment or agency regulation for exceeding the com-
merce power. Yet it was only a matter of time before the Supreme 
Court would have to consider how the principles enunciated in Lo-
pez applied in this field. Though the court's majority ducked the 
ultimate issue of whether federal regulations of isolated waters ex-
ceed the constitutional scope of federal power, it reaffirmed the vi-
tality of its federalism principles in the context of environmental 
protection. 
A. Regulatory Background 
The CWA was enacted "to restore and maintain the chen1ical, physi-
cal, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters. Section 404 
regulates the discharge of material into "navigable waters"-simply 
514 US at 583 concurring). 
USC§§ 1251-1385 The ~~clean Water Ace' the conventional name 
for the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 
4B In New v United 505 US 144 1992L however, the Court did strike 
down portions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 
on federalism grounds. Sec note 20 and accompanying text. 
4
" 33 USC 1251\a). 
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defined as "waters of the United States." 5° It prohibits the "discharge 
of any pollutant" -defined to include dredged n1aterial, rock, sand, 
and solid or industrial waste-into navigable waters without a fed-
eral permit. Section 404 authorizes the U.S. Army Corps of 
neers to issue such permits "for the discharge of dredged or fill ma-
terial into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites. 
Federal regulations promulgated by the Army Corps of Engineers53 
define "waters of the United States" to include 1) all waters used 
for interstate commerce;"4 2) all interstate waters and wetlands;"" 3) 
all tributaries or impoundments of such waterss6 ; and, most signifi-
candy: 
all other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (in-
cluding intermittent streams, mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, 
sloughs, prairie potholes, wet tneadows, playa lakes, or natural 
ponds) the use, degradation, or destruction of which could at-
interstate or foreign commerce including any such waters: 
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers 
for recreational or other purposes; or (ii) From which fish or 
shellfish are or could be taken and sold in interstate or foreign 
commerce; or (iii) Which are used or could be used for indus-
trial purpose by industries in interstate commerce. 
This definition explicitly includes "wetlands adjacent to waters 
(other than waters that are themselves wetlands).""" 
The Supreme Court considered the scope of the Corps' regulatory 
authority in the 1985 case of United States v. Riverside Bayview 
Homes, in which a developer challenged federal jurisdiction over 
"wetlands adjacent to navigable bodies of water and their tributar-
ies" as exceeding the limits of the CWA. 60 The Court rejected this 
argument, finding that Congress sought "to exercise its powers un-
der the Commerce Clause to regulate at least some waters that 
usc§ 1362 (7). 
USC (6), 13ll(al. 
USC§ 1344 (a). Approval of permit hy the Corps is suhject to the EPA's veto 
USC Additionally. the Corps must give the Fish and Wildlife 
Service, National Marine Fisheries Service and the head of the fish and wildlife 
in the relevant state the opportunity comment on permit apr>licatH)ns. 
The EPA has parallel regulations. 40 CFR §~I l 0 
CFR§ (a)(l). 
CFR (a)(2). 
CFR (a)(4), (5). 
CFR § la/1,1/ICmpnasis added). 
CFR § The regulatory definition excludes prior converted erop-
CFR § 
us 121 ( 
Riverside Bayv1ew Homes, 474 tJS at 123. 
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would not be deemed 'navigable' under the classical understanding 
of that term. In particular, the Court upheld "the Corps' conclu-
sion that adjacent wetlands are inseparably bound up with the 'wa-
ters' of the United States, and therefore are subject to the Corps' 
regulatory authority under CWA. Yet the Court did not 
the Corps carte blanche authority to wetlands. It explicitly 
did not address whether the Corps/ authority extended to cover 
"wetlands not necessarily adjacent to other waters, and paid little 
attention to what, if an)j limits the Cmnmerce Clause placed on the 
Corps' authority to regulate wetlands. 
The Anny Corps, however, did not see any limits on its jurisdic-
tion. The year following Riverside Bayview Homes, the Corps pub-
lished its interpretation of its authoritYt commonly referred to as 
the "migratory bird rule/' 64 which stated that the Corps' regulatory 
authority extends to intrastate waters: 
a) Which are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by 
Migratory Bird Treatiesi or 
b) Which are or would be used as habitat by other migratory 
birds which come across state or 
c) Which are or would be used as habitat for endangered spe-
cies; or 
d) Used to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce. 
The Corps thereby effectively asserted its regulatory authority over 
all territory meeting the definition of waters or wetlands throughout 
the United States. 
B. The SWANCC Litigation 
This case arose out of localities' to dispose of their trash. 
The Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) was 
Id at 
Id at ,) 1. In reaching this the Court relied upon the proposition 
that agency's .construction of a statute it charged with enforcing is entitled to 
deference if it reasonable and not conflict with the intent of Con-
"n1•1nr•u; Homes at 124 n 2. 
the ''migratory bird interpretation," as the 
Corps' interpretation issued without the notice and comment procc-
dun:.:s required under the Section .S:13 of the Administrative Procedure Act. See 
SWANCC, 121 Ct at 67H n 1. 
1
''51 FedReg41217(lYH6). 
Unless noted, the summary of the facts is taken from the opinion of 
the federal district court in SWANCC v l JS Army Corps of 998 F.Supp. 
Y46 (ND Ill 1998), aff'd 191 F:id 84S (7th Cir 1999); rev'd 121 S Ct 675 (200lL 
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a municipal corporation formed by 23 local jurisdictions in northern 
Illinois for the purpose of siting and a solid waste disposal 
facility. For this project, SWANCC purchased a 533-acre parcel 
straddling Cook and Kane Counties, previously used for gravel min-
ing. SWANCC intended to use the site to construct a balefUl-that 
a landfill for disposing of baled, non-hazardous solid waste. Much 
of the parcel consisted of mining pits and other depressions that 
filled with water, creating permanent or seasonal ponds. In 1986 and 
1987, SWANCC asked the Army Corps whether portions of the 
balefill site were subject to federal regulation under the CWA due to 
the presence of "apparent wetlands. On each occasion, the Corps 
issued a letter stating that the site contained no wetlands subject to 
federal regulation and that therefore the federal government did not 
have jurisdiction over the site. 
In July 1987, the Illinois Nature Preserves Commission claimed 
that four different species of migratory birds had been observed at 
the site, prompting the Corps to reconsider its determination that 
the SWANCC balefill site was beyond its regulatory jurisdiction. 
Armed with this new information, the Corps reversed course and 
asserted jurisdiction over SWANCC's parcel due to its potential to 
serve as waterfowl habitat. The Corps never claimed that there was 
any hydrological connection between the portions of the site that 
SWANCC sought to develop and broader hydrological systems. None-
theless, the Corps denied SWANCC's request for a permit to fill17.6 
acres of the 533-acre site, and SWANCC sued. 
Neither the trial court nor the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
was persuaded by SWANCC's argument that isolated waters were 
beyond the permissible scope of federal authority. 68 Both courts rea-
soned that the assertion of regulatory jurisdiction over isolated wa-
ters on the basis that migratory birds might use such land as a habi-
tat posed no constitutional difficulty under Lopez. While the filling 
of fewer than two-dozen acres of isolated waters or wetlands might 
have a negligible economic impact, r'the destruction of the natural 
habitat of migratory birds in the aggregate 'substantially affects' in-
terstate commerce. The Seventh Circuit cited government esti-
mates that over 3 million Americans spent an estimated $1.3 billion 
dollars hunting migratory birds in 1996, and "about 11 percent of 
them traveled across state lines to do so." 70 Over ten million more 
traveled across state lines to birdwatch. On this basis, the Seventh 
998 F Supp at 948. 
998 F Supp at 956; 191 F3d 
SWANCC, 191 F3d at 850. 
I d. 
71 Id. 
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Circuit affirmed the lower court and held that "the destruction of 
migratory bird habitat and the attendant decrease in the populations 
of these birds 'substantially affects' interstate commerce. 
C. The Supreme Court's Decision 
The Supreme Court reversed, though without reaching the constitu-
tional question. Instead/ the Court employed a clear-statement rule, 
first developed in Ashcroft, under which ambiguous 
statutes are read narrowly when a broader interpretation would up-
set the usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers. 
Given the importance of the Constitution's underlying federalist 
structure, the Court 1nade clear that it would find that Congress 
sought to reach the outer bounds of its Commerce Clause power 
only where the statutory language Inandates such a result. Upset-
ting the federalist balance requires "a clear indication that Congress 
intended that result." Congress bears the burden to enact statutory 
language that leaves no question that it intended to displace state 
efforts in the area before an executive agency can assert such au-
thority. 
In each case construing Congress' enumerated powers, the Court 
can make two possible errors. First, the Court could uphold a federal 
action that exceeds Congress' delegated authority. Conversely, the 
Court could invalidate a federal action that is actually within Con-
gress' enumerated powers. In relying upon a canon of statutory in-
terpretation that places the onus upon Congress to assert its inten-
tion to expand federal power, the SWANCC majority made clear its 
preference for avoiding the former error at the risk of committing 
more of the latter. Furthermore/ by requiring a clear statement, the 
Court effectively raises the cost to Congress of its rightful 
authority to upset the traditional federal-state balance, thus helping 
to prevent Congress from exercising its power too lightly. The Court 
has said that "Congress may legislate in areas traditionally regulated 
by the States. This is an extraordinary power in a federalist system. 
It is a power that we must assume Congress does not exercise 
lightly." 75 
Congress enacted the CWA in 1972 to "restore and maintain the 
·.c Id . 
.SOl US at 460-61 (requiring a '1 clear statement" of LoJagr,ess:tonai intent pre-
empt state authority). 
SWANCC, 121 Ct at 
) (stating that, unless ,__,uu;;•~"" 
to have sigmhcarltly 
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chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 7r' 
To this end, the 1972 Act imposed technology-based effluent stan-
dards on industry and expanded funding for municipal sewage treat-
ment. It also permits for discharge of effluents or other 
materials into waters of the United States. However, states that 1net 
certain requirements became eligible to assume responsibility for 
administering the various permitting programs under federal super-
vision. As the Court noted, not only expanded federal wa-
ter quality efforts, it also sought to 
recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and 
rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to 
plan the develop1nent and use (including restoration, preserva-
tion and enhancen1ent) of land and water resources, and to con-
sult with the Adn1inistrator in the exercise of his authority. 
The Court was not convinced by the Corps' interpretation of its 
authority to include all waters, including wetlands, irrespective of 
their size, navigability, or location. As noted above, CWA section 
404(a) authorizes the Corps to regulate the discharge of fill material 
into "navigable waters," defined as "waters of the United States. ?H 
The Court extended this definition no further than wetlands and 
other waters adjacent to navigable waters. While the Court would 
normally defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute that it ad-
ministers under the Chevron doctrine, the Court refused to do so 
here. "Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes 
the outer limits of Congress' power" the Court demands a "clear in-
dication that Congress intended that result."~>o The Court found insuf-
ficient evidence in the text or legislative history to conclude that 
Congress sought to reach "nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate wa-
ters," in either the 1972 Act or amendments passed in 1977. De-
spite the Corps' insistence to the contrary, the Court found no clear 
indication that "navigable waters" include "isolated ponds, some 
only seasonal, wholly located within two Illinois counties. 
While the Court did not directly address the Constitutional ques-
tion, it noted that where an assertion of federal authority "alters the 
federal-state framework by permitting federal encroach1nent upon a 
SvVANCC. 12 I S Ct at 683 Florida 
Coast Building Contr. Trades 
Id at 6H2-R3. 
Id 6R2. 
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traditional state power" it is particularly reluctant to stretch the 
bounds of Congress' delegated power. The majority noted that al-
lowing the Corps "to clain1 federal jurisdiction over ponds and mud-
flats falling within the /Migratory Bird Rule' would result in a signif-
icant impingement of the States' traditional and prin1ary power over 
land and water use. To avoid this result, the court interpreted the 
statute narrowly. The Court thereby adopted a decision rule de-
signed to minimize the likelihood that it would erroneously com-
pron1ise the federalist design, hut at the sa1ne time failed to resolve 
whether federal regulation of isolated wetlands is beyond constitu-
tional bounds. One year earlier, a unanimous Court applied the 
same principle to overturn a federal arson prosecution where there 
was no clear connection to interstate commerce, lest it adopt a stat-
utory interpretation that would leave "hardly a [parcel of ]land ... 
outside the federal statute's domain. If the Court is to resolve this 
issue, it will take a clear act and not an administrative 
interpretation of a broad yet ambiguous statutory scheme. 
Before discussing the environmental aspects of the Court's deci-
sion/ it is worth noting that the Court's insistence on a "clear state-
ment" of Congressional intent to intrude upon traditional state 
powers would seem to be particularly appropriate where it is an 
agency interpretation, and not the underlying authorizing statute, 
which is at issue. This is because the legislature can be expected to 
be more solicitous of state concerns than an executive agency. As 
the Court noted in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Au-
tlwrity, 116 the political system contains "built in restraints'/ resulting 
from '1 state participation in federal governmental action" that work 
to limit federal intrusion in local matters. Members of ,._,~ .. ~ ...... ".!""'""~ 
are more responsive to the concerns of local regional concerns than 
centralized regulatory oversight could, in 
theory, reign in regulatory actions that run roughshod over federal-
ism concerns, but this is unlikely to be an effective limit. Indeed, 
insofar as Court's federalism jurisprudence stands for the propo-
sition that courts must safeguard federalism, this proposition should 
operate at its strongest in the context administrative actions that 
do not directly respond to an explicit cmnmand. 
Id at 683. 
Id at 
,)0, 44 (1994) 
by local governments). 
Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation US 
1\-h'-'><'ll\JU of land a function traditionally performed 
jones v United States, 20 Ct 1904, 1911 (2000). 
'
1 4Ci9 US ( 1985). 
~ Id at 
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III. THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE 
TO FEDERALISM 
Justice Stevens in dissent accused the SWANCC majority of /{need-
lessly weaken[ing] our principal safeguard against toxic water."H8 
The dissent argues that using federalism doctrines to limit federal 
regulatory authority over environmental matters risks ecological 
ruin. Only federal regulatory intervention can prevent 11 the destruc-
tion of the aquatic environment" and ensure that 1'[o]ur Nation's 
waters no longer burn. A given pond or wetland may be isolated 
hydrologically from other waters, but migratory waterfowl and other 
species connect such places with the broader ecosystein. In this re-
gard, the dissent echoes much current commentary on the proper 
role of the federal government in environmental protection.90 
The argument for broad federal power to regulate environmental 
n1atters is grounded in a concern over interstate externalities. If the 
federal government is constrained by a narrow reading of its enumer-
ated powers, there is a concern that states will be unable or unwill-
ing to account for the effect that their regulatory decisions have 
upon other states or the nation as a whole. As the dissent explains: 
The destruction of aquatic migratory bird habitat, like so many 
other environmental problems, is an action in which the bene-
fits (e.g. a new landfill) are disproportionately local, while many 
of the costs (e.g., fewer migratory birds) are widely dispersed 
and often borne by citizens living in other States. In such situa-
tions, described by economists as involving 'externalities,' fed-
eral regulation is both appropriate and necessary. 91 
The dissent cites two authorities for this analysis. The first is an 
article by Professor Richard Revesz arguing, among other things, 
that "[t]he presence of interstate externalities is a powerful reason 
for intervention at the federal level. The second is Hodel v. Vir-
ginia Surface Mining eJ Reclamation Association, which upheld the 
SWANCC 121 S Ct at 684 (Stevens, Ult>:~enunJ;/. Justice Stevens was joined by 
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter. 
Id at 684. 
'-'""""'Uf"·"• Oliver A. Houck and Michael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands 
COJ'1SU1ert1tlc>n of Water 404 
to the 54 Md L Rev 1242, 1244 (1995) (stating that it 
obvious when the CWA was enacted 1'that the national interest in clean 
water and related wetlands functions merits a strong federal presence."). 
SWANCC 121 Ct at 695 (Stevens, dissenting). 
Richard L Revesz, Interstate Competition: 
'Race-to-the-Bottom· "'ltLCJllUL 67 NYU LRev 
1210, 1222 
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Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act against a Commerce 
Clause challenge. The dissent notes that Hodel deferred to Con-
finding that nationwide standards were "essential" in order 
to avoid "destructive interstate competition 11 that could undermine 
environmental standards. Ironicall~ much of Revesz's academic 
work has been devoted to challenging the conventional justifica-
tions for federal environmental regulation/ including that advanced 
by Hodel. Indeed, the central thesis of the article the dissent cites 
is that "destructive interstate competition" cannot justify federal en-
vironmental regulation. 
The analytical confusion of the dissent notwithstanding, "exter-
nalities," as used by the dissent, embraces three separate arguments 
that might be made to justify federal regulation of the environment 
under some conditions, including isolated waters as in SWANCC. 
First is the perennial concern that leaving environmental pro-
tection to states will generate a "race to the bottom" as states relax 
environmental protections to compete with one another for indus-
trial development. Second, activity in one state may result in an 
interstate "spillover" as pollution or some other ill effect is imposed 
on another jurisdiction. Third, insofar as an environmental resource, 
such as waterfowl habitat, has the characteristics of a public good, 
states may underinvest in its protection. 
A. Race-to-the-Bottom 
The race-to-the-bottom theory presumes that interjurisdictional 
competition creates a prisoner's dilemma for states. Each state 
wants to attract industry for the economic benefits that it provides. 
Each state also to maintain an optimal level of environmen-
tal protection. However, in order to attract industr~ the theory 
holds, states will lower environmental safeguards so as to reduce the 
Hodel, 452 US at 281-82) (Stevens, dlslsentmlsl-
Rcvesz, 67 NYU L Rev 1210 (cited in note 92)i Richard Revesz1 
Bottom Minn L Rev 
( 1997); Richard Revesz, 
Cntique, in John Ferejohn and Barry R. Weingast, eds, 
He 97-127 (Hoover 1997) Critique"t 
Richard and Environmental Externalities. U Pa L 
Rev 2341 ( 1996). 
Revesz, 67 NYU L Rev at 1211 (cited in note 92). 
v See1 for Ronald McKinnon &. Thomas Competition in Fed-
The Role of Politict1l and Financial Constraints. in John Ferejohn and 
Barry R. Weingast, eds, New · Can the Trusted! (Hoover 
1997) (noting the three distinct ways externalities may arise under federalism). 
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regulatory burden they impose upon firms. This competition exerts 
downward pressure on environmental safeguards as firms to 
locate in states where regulatory burdens are the lowest, and states 
to attract industry by the economic burden of envi-
ronmental safeguards. Because the potential benefits of lax regula-
tion are concentrated among relatively few firms, these firms can 
effectively oppose the general public's preference for environmental 
protection regulation. As one commentator explained, "[i]f each 
locality reasons the same way, all will adopt lower standards of envi-
ronmental quality than they would prefer if there were some binding 
mechanism that enabled them simultaneously to enact higher stan-
dards, thus eliminating the threatened loss of industry or develop-
ment." 100 This will lead to social welfare losses even if environmen-
tal harm does not spill over from one state to another. 
The race-to-the-bottmn argument is probably the most cmnmon 
argument for federal environmental regulation, particularly for 
wholly or largely intrastate environmental problems, such as local 
air or water quality. 101 But despite its currency, the theory has come 
under substantial fire. Revesz, the most prominent critic of the race-
to-the-bottom theory, notes that environmental regulation is one of 
several respects in which states compete for business. Firm siting 
and relocation decisions are a function of numerous considerations 
apart from environmental regulation, ranging from taxes and infra-
structure to the cost and skill base of the local workforce, to other 
regulatory policies. Moreover, for many citizens, stronger environ-
mental protections are a reason to move to a state, a fact that creates 
pressures not to reduce environmental standards. 103 This likely off-
sets race-to-the-bottom pressures, particularly since the same citi-
YH See, for example, Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Federalism, 95 
MichL Rev 570, 603-04 (1996). 
See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Public Goods 
the (Harvard U, 1965 ). Proponents of the race-to-the-bottom theory 
also suggest that environmental advocates will have political inHuencc at the 
state and local level than at the national level. See, for Richard B. Stewart, 
l'urnrnll1c of Problems of in Mandating State lm.plemenumc;n 
of National Environmental Policy, 86 Yale L J l 1213 Esty, Revitalizing 
at 597-99 in note 98l. Note that other groups may be effective advocates 
regulation, in part because of state competition for residents and industry. See text 
note 127. 
Yale L J at 1212 (cited in note 99). 
eX<JlmJ)le, Hodel. 452 US at 281-82 
at lOS (cited in note 
'"""'' .... '--''n" have flocked to some western states that 
usc aggressive measures to protect the the fact that these 
impose costs on business and taxpayers." Deborah Jones Merritt, 
94 MichL Rev 674, 70<l ( 1995). 
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zens that demand environ1nental protection make up the workforce 
that companies seek. 
More fundamentally, Revesz detnonstrates that while 
theoretic interactions an1cmg the states could lead to underregula-
tion federal intervention ... it is equally plausible that in 
other instances the reverse would true: that gan1e-theoretic inter-
actions among the states would lead to ovcregulation. For in-
stance, if states determine that tax policy has a greater impact on 
firm siting decisions than environmental regulation, and interjuris-
dictional competition is assmned to generate a race-to-the-bottom, 
states will adopt tax rates on capital that are suboptimal because 
they are less than the cost of providing the infrastructure that capi-
tal requires. In this scenario it may be preferable for each state to 
adopt stringent environn1ental regulations to prevent ex-
cessive industrial development. Yet if each state follows this 
course, the result is too much regulation/ not too little. 
The race-to-the-bottom argument also questionably assumes that 
federal intervention will solve the problem of chronic state under-
regulation. Because states compete for businesses on many fronts, 
establishing a federal tninimum standard in one area simply shifts 
the cmnpetitive pressures into other arenas, such as tax policy or 
tort law. If reducing govern1nental burdens on business is necessary 
to attract corporate investment, and states will race to the bottom, 
establishing minimal environmental does not prevent 
the race fron1 occurring, it Inerely shifts the policy area in which it 
occurs. 106 Instead of adopting suboptin1al environmental regulations, 
states will compete by enacting suboptimal workplace or consumer 
protections. Thus, the race-to-the-bottom argu1nent could just as 
easily become an argu1nent for nationalizing all areas of public pol-
icy that affect corporate decisions. It in Revesz's words, a 
11 frontal attack11 on federalisn1. j()? 
In support of the race-to-the-bottmn theory, commentators point 
to survey data indicating that state policy makers consider the relax-
ation of regulatory standards to attract industrial investment n1ore 
frequently than cmnpanies alter their siting decisions based upon 
Minn L at (cited in 95). For similar argument, 
at 1241-42 (cited in note 92). 
104-0S (cited in 
argument that there IS about envi-
ronmental that makes it more important for the protection of public 
and welfare than other Some of federal intervention 
that protcctwn rclfuucs safeguards than worker 
rates, and the like because of moral or other considerations. for 
L J at 1217-lY in note YlJ). 
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environmental regulations. One study reported survey results in-
dicating that "a substantial minority of states relax their environ-
mental standards in order to attract industrial firms. w9 Yet the 
mere fact that state officials ease the burden environmental regula-
tions impose on business does not necessarily mean that the welfare 
loss from the regulatory relaxation is greater than the welfare gain 
of increased economic activity. More fundamentally, this argument 
assumes an identity between the level of environmental protection 
and the costs imposed upon business. In other words, an environ-
mental policy that makes a state more attractive to industry by re-
ducing the costs of compliance with environmental rules does not 
necessarily compromise environmental protection. 
An obvious example of how more lenient environmental rules are 
not necessarily inconsistent with environmental protection is the 
replacement of a command-and-control technology mandate with a 
performance standard. Mandating the use of a given technology or 
even imposing percentage emission reductions on a given industry 
may produce widely divergent costs across firms. Some firms will 
find it less expensive to reduce emissions through some means other 
than that mandated by law, perhaps by making different modifica-
tions to the production process. For example, under then-existing 
air pollution regulations, Amoco's refinery in Yorktown, Virginia 
had to spend approximately $40 million to reduce emissions of 
VOCs (volatile organic compounds) in the manner the law required. 
Yet in a top-to-bottmn audit of the facility conducted with the coop-
eration of the Environmental Protection Agency, Amoco discovered 
that the facility could have generated the same emission reduction 
at one quarter of the cost had the facility merely been required to 
meet an environmental benchmark. 110 
Other firms may find it cheaper still to mitigate the environmen-
tal impact of their emissions by paying for emission reductions else-
where. For instance, the imposition of a watershed or airshed-wide 
emission trading scheme tnay allow polluting companies to reduce 
their costs of compliance by paying for emission reductions by other 
firms with lower costs. Consider two companies that each emit 20 
Sec Kirsten H. Engel, a 
and Is It the Rottom "I. 48 Hastings L J not, however, 
purport document declines in envmmmcntal quality resulting from such interju-
risdictional competition. Rather, it assumes that reducing the stringency of environ-
mental regulation compromises environmental protection. Yet this 
sumption is unwarranted/ discussed below. 
109 Id at 279. 
110 Ronald E. Schmitt, Amoco/EPA Ynrbt-n.Mrr• ,. vr>onor>f'£) 
Thing, 4 Nat. Resources 
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units of pollution per year at a cost to Firm A of $20 per unit and to 
Firm B of $30 per unit. If a regulation requires each company to 
reduce its emissions by 25 percent, the total cost of the emission 
reductions will be $250 [ (5 x $20) + (5 x $30) ]. However1 the same 
emission reductions could be achieved by allowing Firm B to com-
ply by paying Firm A to reduce its emissions by five additional units, 
thereby producing the emission reductions for $200 [ (5 x $20) + (5 
x $20) L or 20 percent lower cost. Indeed, under such a regime it 
could be possible to reduce emissions by two additional units at a 
lower cost than under the command-and-control regitne. 
This is not to say that such policy reforms will always be more 
cost-effective or available or that states will consistently adopt such 
policies if given the chance. It simply undercuts a key premise upon 
which the race-to-the-bottom theory relies-that reducing business' 
cost of environmental regulation must come at the expense of envi-
ronmental protection. 
It is also important to recognize that the trade-off between envi-
ronmental protection and compliance costs will not remain con-
stant over time. State policy makers and bureaucrats can, given the 
proper incentives, develop new means of reducing the severity of the 
trade-off. Interjurisdictional competition, by forcing states to com-
pete for both industry and residents, encourages this process. A state 
that wishes to provide a greater level of environmental protection 
to its citizens but does not want to create a less friendly investment 
climate for business will seek to adopt new types of environmental 
protection that do a superior job of meeting both goals. Interjurisdic-
tional competition thus spurs a policy discovery process through 
which new means of reconciling environmental and economic con-
cerns are developed and adopted. 
Like the race-to-the-bottom argument, empirical that 
suggests the theory is flawed is not new. In the early part of the 
twentieth century, when the Supreme Court first struggled with the 
constitutional limits on the exercise of Congress's commerce power, 
proponents of an expansive interpretation argued that federal regula-
tion was necessary to protect the weak and disenfranchised from 
the vagaries of the market. Thus, in 1916 Congress a law 
prohibiting the interstate shipment of goods produced in plants that 
e1nployed children under the age of 14. 111 When challenged in the 
Supreme Court two years later, the government warned that without 
the law "[t]he shipment of child-made goods outside of one State 
directly induces similar employment of children in competing 
Act of Sept. 1, 1916 ch 4,12, 
hours that children between the 
Stat The law also limited the number of 
of 14 and 16 could work. 
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states." 112 Yet at the time State in the Union" had a law regu-
lating child labor. 1 
The race-to-the-bottom theory is no better at predicting state reg-
ulatory behavior in the context of environmental protection than it 
was with child labor. If the race-to-the-bottom theory were accurate, 
one would expect states to lag behind the federal government in de-
veloping programs to protect wetlands, and states with the greatest 
proportion of wetlands to slower to protect wetlands than those 
with a lower proportion of wetlands. Assutning that limiting the use 
and development of wetlands imposes costs on industry and dis-
courages economic investment, these costs will be greatest in states 
with the proportion of wetlands that might be burdened by 
regulation. At the same time, the n1arginal cost of developing an 
acre of wetlands will be in states with the proportion 
of wetlands because such development will have a smaller propor-
tionate impact on that state's wetland inventory and, presumably, 
the ecological benefits that the wetlands provide. From this one can 
outline a testable hypothesis: "As a general rule, the larger a state's 
wetland inventory, the more important it is to the nation, but the 
less important saving it may appear to the state itself-indeed, the 
more onerous the burden of protecting it will appear." 
The history of state wetland regulation, however, paints quite a 
different picture. Not only did states not wait for the federal govern-
ment to begin regulating wetlands, but the order in which state be-
gan to act is the precise opposite of what the race-to-the-bottom 
theory would predict. Fifteen states have more than ten percent of 
their land area in wetlands, according to the National Wetland In-
ventory.1 All of these states but Alaska enacted their first wetland 
protection statutes prior to when a federal court declared that 
the CWA applied to wetlands. 116 Moreover, most of these states have 
some protections for inland wetlands, in addition to coastal wet-
Hammer v Dagenhart. 247 US 2Sl 1 256-57 (1918). A similar race-to-the-bottom 
argument was made by the government in defense of the National Industrial Recov-
ery Act. ALA. Schechter Poultry v United States. 295 US 495, S49 ( l93S ). 
Hammer, 247 US at 27S added). The Supreme Court struck down 
the statute for exceeding the scope of Commerce Clause power, but this 
decision was overturned in States v Darby. 12 US 100 ( 1941 ). 
Houck and Rolland, Md L Rev at 1253 (cited in note 90). 
Jon. A. Kusler, et al, Wetland Regulation: 
t:mergmg Trends Table 1 (Association of State Wetland Managers. 1 ':l94\ ("Kusler, 
These are Alabama; Alaska, Delaware, Florida, 
Georgia, Louisiana. Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota1 Mississippi, New 
Jersey/ North Carolina, South Carolina/ and Wisconsin. 
This summarized in Adler. Envtl L at 4l-S4 (cited in note 4\. 
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lands. As noted in a recent review of state efforts, "most of the 
states with the largest wetland acreages have adopted wetland regu-
latory efforts for all or a portion of their wetlands." 1 States with 
a lower proportion of wetlands generally enacted state regulatory 
programs later, if at all. This is the exact opposite of what the race-
to-the-bottom theory would predict. 
The race-to-the-bottom theory not only that states with 
the most wetlands would regulate last, but also that few states 
would regulate in excess of federal requirements. This would drive 
investments to other states just as would state regulation in the ab-
sence of federal regulation. Moreover, once the federal government 
regulates/ states are likely to devote their resources to those areas 
not already occupied by the federal government where state efforts 
are likely to generate greater marginal returns both to the state as a 
whole and to politicians who need not share credit with federal of-
ficials. 
Despite incentives not to act, many states have adopted programs 
that reach beyond federal wetlands regulations as implemented prior 
to SWANCC. Several states regulate sizable buffer zones, and not 
just the wetlands themselves. The Maryland Department of the En-
vironn1ent, for instance, regulates buffer zones for nontidal wet-
lands of between 25 and 100 New York's statute protects a 
1 00-foot buffer zone that local governments may extend. Federal 
regulations contain no such protections. In addition, some states 
have sought to develop non-regulatory progra1ns to supplement or 
substitute for regulatory programs. States also are taking the lead 
in developing systems for classifying wetlands and evaluating their 
functions. Despite the supposedly greater sophistication and tech-
nical at the federal level, there is little that the 
Note, 
Envtl LJ 459, 477 (l 
Wetland at 3 (cited in note I 1 
Analysis of Nontidal Wetland Regulation Maryland, 16 Va 
1 1
" Patricia Riexinger, Local Implementation of New York:s rresnvvarei Wet-
lands Act, in Wetland the of the (Ass'n State 
Wetland Managers, 227, 229 ("Ricxingcr, Local Implementation"). 
See Note, 16 Va Envtl LJ at 477 (cited in note 118) (stating that 1'[r]q,rulation of 
activities in the huffer unique to law, and not found in the section 
404 program."). 
121 Kusler! al, 
~ymposium, Wetland Pmtectwn: 
(Ass'n of State Wetland Managers, J 
For instance, of 1992 ten states were using wetland classification systems to 
evaluate function and value in the process. William E. and Den-
nis Magee, Should Wetlands Be to the Same Regulation! Natural Re-
Env, Summer 1 at .)4. 
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Corps systematically considers wetland function in the regulatory 
process. 
If the race-to-the-bottom cannot explain this trend, what can? 
One possibility is suggested by the work of Nobel Prize winning 
economist F. A. Hayek, who noted that much valuable knowledge is 
particular to time and place. Not until late in the twentieth cen-
tury were wetlands valued for their ecological functions or the focus 
substantial conservation efforts. Not until the 1970s was there 
widespread recognition of the ecological functions that wetlands 
provide, including water filtration and flood mitigation, as well as 
their value for waterfowl and other wildlife habitat. Most of these 
benefits are localized. Therefore, the greatest beneficiaries of wet-
land protection efforts would be those closest to the wetlands. Simi-
larly, knowledge of the specific ecological functions provided by 
wetlands in a given region likely also would be localized. This puts 
state and local officials in a better position to address environmental 
concerns than federal officials in a centralized regulatory bureau-
cracy. In the words of one local official, there is "a need for a com-
munity perspective not because local governments are more perfect, 
but because they are more local." 126 Therefore, one possible explana-
tion for the pattern of wetland regulation could be that states with 
the most wetlands were most aware of the ecological values played 
by local wetlands. This also would explain why many localities 
choose to regulate wetlands even more stringently than their respec-
tive state governments. 
See Michael Mortimer, Irregular nc-~;;UH1Ll<"lll 
Water Is the Army Corps of .cn.gm~eeJ"S 
Litigation 455, 468-70 
See, F. A. 
521-22 (1945). 
The Use of Knowledge 
Blame! 
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J Envtl L 
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Henry N. Butler and Jonathan R. Macey, Using to Improve Envi-
ronmental 27 (American Enterprise Institute, 1996) (stating that "[f]ederal reg-
ulators never have been and never will he able to acquire and assimilate the enormous 
amount of information necessary to make optimal regulatory judgments that reflect 
the technical requirements of particular locations and pollution sources."). 
Maggy Hurchalla, Community Perspective for Wetlands Protection, in Wet-
land Protection.· the Role of the (Ass'n of State Wetland Manag-
1985) at 260 ("Hurchalla, A Community Ms. Hurchalla was then 
Commissioner of Martin County, Florida. 
For instance, York, many localities opt to the state wetlands 
program and tighten the requirements because 11 local governments know 
their better than the state agency does." Riexinger, Local 
Jmpiementt:ltWill at 229 in note 119). which enacted the first 
wetland protection statute in 1963, based its statute on preexisting local ordinances. 
Alexandra D. Dawson, Massachusetts' in Reg;ulating Wetlands, in 
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It also should be the case that insofar as wetlands and other eco-
logical goods provide economic benefits, industries and interests 
that rely upon these benefits will organize and lobby for greater pro-
tection. Industry is not a monolith. Although commercial develop-
ers may suffer from wetland regulation, other industries, such as 
tourism, and fishing, may benefit. Protecting ecological resources in 
some areas may also increase property values, thereby increasing 
rather than diminishing the tax base. Finally, states with abundant 
wetlands and strong environmental safeguards are likely to attract 
people that share preferences for these resources, and who would 
advocate reinforcing the protections that are in place. In this fash-
ion, interjurisdictional competition should augment environmental 
protection rather than undermine it. These explanations for the pat-
tern of wetland protection are speculative, but they are more conso-
nant with the historical evidence than the race-to-the-bottom theory. 
B. Spillover Problems 
While the threat of a destructive race to the bottom may not provide 
a sound justification for federal intervention, the presence of inter-
state spillovers might. 128 This is particularly the case with trans-
boundary pollution-" a physical externality or spillover that crosses 
state lines.11 This sort of interstate externality or spillover effect 
must be differentiated from the sort of pecuniary externality that 
results from the overuse of an interstate commons or failure to pro-
tect an ecological public good. These latter effects are discussed 
in the next section. 
Pollution that crosses political boundaries is a legitimate federal 
concern. Yet despite the dissent's protestations to the contrary, it is 
not at all clear that any such spillovers were in SWANCC. 
The question before the court was, explicitly, whether the federal 
regulatory authority reached isolated waters that, by definition, are 
not hydrologically connected to interstate or otherwise navigable 
waterways. There is, therefore, little reason to believe that SWANCC 
undermines the federal government's legitimate role in the control 
of interstate pollution problems. 
The dissent correctly noted that the development of waters that 
An advocate of federalism notes that the inherent difficulties in regula-
tion by any single state, transboundary pollution would seem to present a clear 
for regulatory authority from local to more centralized levels of governance." 
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serve as habitats for migratory birds will, over time, produce mea-
surable impacts in other states. Wetlands, in the words of two com-
rnentators, "are aptly seen as biological factories" producing wildlife 
and other interstate goods. 131 If migratory birds have fewer habitats in 
Illinois, there may be fewer such birds in states throughout their 
migration path. In this sense, then, the Corps' denial of SWANCC's 
permit could be characterized as an effort to control such interstate 
externalities. 
But this argument proves too much. If SWANCC's development 
of hydrologically isolated waters can be regulated because of the 
marginal impacts on wildlife populations in other jurisdictions, 
then the concept of what constitutes an interstate spillover worthy 
of federal regulation begins to lose its analytical utility. Although 
migratory birds rely upon wetlands and fly across state lines, letting 
this alone establish a basis for federal regulation would obliterate 
any limit on federal regulatory authority, as would accepting the ar-
gument for federal regulation explicitly rejected in Lopez. The Lopez 
dissenters argued that the federal government could regulate the 
possession of guns in or near schools because of the potential exter-
nalities that guns in schools could disrupt the educational process, 
thereby depressing the earning potential or productivity of the fu-
ture labor force and dramatically affecting the nation's econmnic fu-
ture. Much as wetlands are "biological factories" to be regulated 
like industrial factories, schools could be seen as the factories that 
produce future workers and managers. But this was not enough to 
justify the regulation in Lopez. 
Alteration of habitat or other lands that is likely to produce broad 
dispersed external effects on other jurisdictions is likely to have 
greater effects at the source. Any effects of the SWANCC balefill on 
migratory waterfowl populations in Texas are dwarfed by its poten-
tial environmental impacts in Cook and Kane Counties, Illinois. 
This may explain why local environmental groups intervened on the 
side of the Army Corps from the onset of the litigation in the dis-
trict court. While the dissent characterizes the waste disposal proj-
ect as generating concentrated local benefits and dispersed costs on 
the nation at large, it is more common to characterize waste dis-
posal facilities in the opposite fashion. Landfills, incinerators, and 
the like are generally considered "locally undesirable land-uses" or 
"LULUs" that impose substantial costs on local residents while pro-
viding dispersed benefits to a broader community. In the case of a 
landfill, for instance, local residents may suffer from odor, pollution, 
or depressed land values, while the broader region benefits from 
131 Houck and Rolland/ 54 Md L Rev l24H (cited in note 90). 
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expensive waste disposal. Such concerns, whether justified on en-
vironmental grounds or not, tend to generate strong local opposition 
to LULUs-typically referred to as "NIMBYism" for "Not-In-My-
Backyard"-or demands for cmnpensation. The strength of these 
local responses would suggest that federal intervention is unneces-
sary to prevent spillovers in many cases. 
The problen1 with simply pointing to the presence of an external-
ity is that it can authorize just about any environmental regulation 
because an individual's or jurisdiction's environmental decision of-
ten can displease someone else. A more reasonable standard is based 
upon the sort of tangible spillover effects that would be actionable 
at common law, such as emitting pollutants upstream, blocking wa-
ter flow, and modifying river currents so as to induce flowing. Where 
transaction costs or political difficulties prevent states from engag-
ing in Coasian bargaining or establishing interstate compacts, fed-
eral intervention to address such concerns may be warranted. 1M Reg-
ulating any land-use that could have a marginal impact on the 
greater ecosystem is not. Ironically, were it not for the CWA itself, 
states might have greater recourse to federal common law for redress 
of more serious interstate pollution. 
The decision in SWANCC, although it limits federal regulatory 
authority, does not limit the federal governmenes regulatory author-
ity over navigable waters that have substantial interstate character-
istics, including wetlands. The Court's majority found the CWA to 
distinguish between the protection of water resources that are clearly 
interstate in character and those that are not. This affirms the fed-
eral role in controlling interstate environmental matters without 
justifying the regulation of anything that could conceivably generate 
an interstate externality. 
The decision therefore affirn1s the econmnies of per-
for Richard A. Epstein, Waste the Dormant Lo.mn1en:e 
3 Green Bag 2d ! 1999) that local externalities from waste 
tics may JUStify limits on interstate commerce in solid waste). But Jonathan H. 
Adler, Waste Dormant Clause-A Reply, Green Bag 2d 353 (2000) 
(arguing that no limits on interstate commerce are justified); Richard A. Epstein, 
Waste Commerce Green Bag 2d ,163 (2000) 
(defending the 
See Adler, 3 Green Bag 2d at 359-60 (cited in note 
1 One possibility would be to adopt a rule" for interstate pollution under 
which states could receive protection from upstream or upwind jurisdictions insofar 
they protect their citizens from equivalent environmental harms. See MerrilL 
Golden Rules (cited in note 128). 
1 Prior to passage of the CWA, the Supreme Court common law nui-
sance suits fur interstate water pollution. See Illinois Milwaukee. 406 US 91 (I 972). 
After of the CWA, the Court held that the Act preempted such 
smts. Illinois, 451 US 304 ( 1981 ). 
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haps the ecologies of scale-that characterize different environmen-
tal concerns. The local and regional nature of many environmental 
problems means that local knowledge and expertise is necessary to 
develop proper solutions. While pollution of a small, intrastate pond 
may create ripple effects on environmental resources in other states, 
the ecological life of that pond is still locally concentrated. Wetlands 
vary in type and function dramatically throughout the country. Lo-
cal wetland protection programs can, and often do, take account of 
local conditions. In the words of one state wetland official, "Okee-
chobee County doesn't need to worry about mangrove estuaries. 
Dade doesn't need to worry about phosphate. Leon doesn't need to 
worry about the Everglades." The diversity of state freshwater pro-
tection efforts reflects "the diversity of freshwater wetland types 
across the nation and state preferences." 
It should also be noted that direct federal efforts to control physi-
cal spillover problems have been rather limited. Only in recent years 
has the Environmental Protection Agency responded to concerns 
about interstate air pollution under the Clean Air Act. Although 
the Clean Water Act also authorizes EPA regulation of interstate 
water problems, these provisions are rarely invoked. Federal ne-
glect of transboundary pollution suggests one of two conclusions. 
First, transboundary pollution may be mostly a relatively minor 
concern. Assuming that the impacts of pollution are generally most 
acute at or near the source, absent a race to the bottom most states 
and localities will act to address local environmental concerns be-
fore they generate substantial spillovers. 140 The second alternative 
is that the federal government is simply ineffectual at controlling 
interstate pollution, due either to special-interest pressures at the 
federal level or to institutional incapacity. Either explanation of fed-
eral failure to control transboundary spillovers reinforces the con-
clusion that enumerated powers need not be stretched to accommo-
date expansive regulation in the name of environmental protection. 
C. Habitat as a Commons 
Not all interstate externalities are the result of pollution crossing 
state lines. There also can be externalities in the provision of an 
interstate public good, such as wildlife habitat. Local residents will 
Hurchalla1 A at 260 (cited in note 126). 
Kusler/ al, at 12 in note 115). 
See, for example, lVlichigan EPA. 213 FJd 663 (2000) (upholding most of EPA 
requirement that upwind states reduce downwind emissions of nitrogen oxide). 
See Merrill/ 46 Duke L J at 960-61 in note 128!. 
Id at 976-77. 
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not capture all of the benefits of their state's decision to create or 
protect local wildlife habitat. Individuals in other states who care 
about the survival of a species and those who wish to observe, hunt, 
or otherwise derive satisfaction from the prospering of the species 
also will benefit. This is particularly true in the case of habitat for 
migratory birds, the benefits of which are spread throughout their 
Inigratory range. 
Because other states will free ride on a state's provision of habitat, 
there is understandable concern that states will protect a subopti-
mal amount of habitat. Just as private firms in a competitive market 
normally will undersupply goods that produce benefits for which 
they cannot charge, states in a federalist systen1 would be expected 
to underproduce goods, such as wildlife habitat, whose benefits are 
enjoyed by taxpayers in other states. 
The public-good characteristics of isolated waters that serve as 
habitat for migratory species could provide a rational basis for fed-
eral intervention, but it is not clear of what kind. Governments pro-
vide most public goods, from lighthouses and courts to police and 
national defense, through their powers to tax and spend. Govern-
ment does not require landowners to donate the use of their land for 
military installations. Instead, the government levies taxes and uses 
the revenue to purchase what is needed for national defense, in rare 
cases through the power of eminent domain. 
If wetlands are a public good because they provide habitat for mi-
gratory birds, limiting the federal government's ability to regulate 
the use of wetlands does not prevent the government from rectifying 
the suboptimal provision of wildlife habitat. The Commerce Clause 
limitation on federal regulatory authority under SWANCC does not 
meaningfully limit the use of the spending clause. Congress is as 
able to appropriate money for wetland conservation after SWANCC 
as it was at the height of the New Deal era. 
There is ample evidence that spending programs can effectively 
subsidize the creation and protection of wetlands. Federal support 
for the protection of waterfowl habitat dates back some seventy 
years to the sale of "duck stamps" to hunters that created a dedi-
cated source of revenue for conservation of an estimated 4.5 million 
acres. 141 Today there are several programs that subsidize wetland con-
servation and restoration, including the Fish & Wildlife Service's Part-
ners for Wildlife program, the North American Waterfowl Manage-
ment Plan created in 1986, and the Wetland Reserve Program. Under 
programs1 federal govern1nent enters into private agree-
Karkkaincn, Cornell L 
n.l90 (1997). 
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ments with landowners to restore wetlands on their property, while 
subsidizing the cost of restoration and the purchase of a permanent 
or multi-year easement to ensure that the wetland is protected. In 
1995, these three programs restored an estimated 48,000 acres, 
42,000 acres, and 118,000 acres of wetlands respectively, for a total 
of over 200,000 acres of restored wetlands in a single year. This 
compares favorably with an esti1nated average gross wetland loss 
rate of 156,000 acres per year from 1982-1992. The cost of these 
programs is relatively low-typically than $1,000 per acre, in-
cluding the cost of restoration, technical assistance and the pur-
chase of an easement. 
Relying upon the federal spending power to provide environmen-
tal goods such as wildlife habitat also reduces the potential for re-
gional rent-seeking. Federal regulation can enable one constituency 
to impose its policy preferences on another at minimal cost. States 
with strong 11 pro-wetland" sentiment, but few wetlands, are likely 
to support greater regulation of wetlands nationwide as they will 
receive the benefit of having their preference for more wetlands ful-
filled without bearing the costs. Even if it is assumed that wetlands 
generate positive externalities that are evenly distributed nation-
wide, such as larger populations of migratory waterfowl, regional 
disparities in the concentration of wetlands can lead to regional 
rent-seeking, as the costs of preserving wetlands are concentrated on 
those areas that have the most desirable ecological characteristics. 
Forcing the federal government to pay for the creation or conserva-
tion of wetlands reduces this problem, as both the costs and benefits 
of providing the environmental benefits are more widely dispersed. 
It is important to note that simply because something meets the 
traditional economic definition of a public good, this does not mean 
that it will not be provided privately. Many people place substan-
Jonathan Tolman, Swamped: How America 'No Net at 2 (Com-
petitive Enterprise Institute, April 1997), <http://www.cei.org/MonoReader.asp?ID= 
11 April 2001) ("Tolman, Swampedn). Department of ana-
believe that difficult to confirm. See Ralph E. Heimlich, et al., 
Wedands and Private and Public Benefits, Agricultural Eco-
nomic Report No. at (USDA, l99R). But these also state that the 
amount of restoration year doubled from 1992 to 19961 and exceeds 1 RO,OOO 
per year. Jd. 
ld 20, Table 
Tblman, at 13-14 (cited note 142). In the per-acre of wet-
land restoration, including the costs of easements, $790 for the Wetland Reserve 
Program, and$773 for the North American Waterfowl Management Program. Id at 13-lS. 
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tial value on the existence of species or the preservation of habitat 
and are willing to invest their time, Inoney and effort in ensuring 
that certain species survive. In the ease of migratory waterfowl, the 
most obvious exatnple of this phenomenon is Ducks Unlimited 
(DU). According to the own it has restored and 
protected over 9 million acres of waterfowl habitat in North Arner-
ica. Other, smaller and less-well-known groups engage in si1nilar 
activities, as do some corporations. Individuals and corporations 
also can receive tax deductions for their contributions to such ef-
forts, which may offset public goods proble1ns. Even if this private 
activity does not fully offset under-provision of habitat due to its 
public good characteristics/ it should be considered when assessing 
the need for federal intervention. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
FEDERALISM 
Faced with the prospect of having to defend its federalism jurispru-
dence from the environmental challenge, the Supreme Court ducked. 
Whereas in and Morrison the Court rnajority articulated the 
rationale for 1naintaining substantive limits on federal regulatory 
authorit~ in SWANCC the Court simply said that had not 
(yet) pushed Constitutional bounds. 
One reason for the Court's apparent reluctance to re-articulate 
the rationale for its federalist jurisprudence n1ay have been the sub-
matter. The rhetoric of the and Morrison dissents aside, 
there was little doubt that the provisions struck down in either case 
were not to address a pressing national concern. Few believe 
that the solution to school violence or don1estic abuse was to be found 
in the of the federal code at issue in or Morrison. 
Gun possession and domestic violence are not traditional subjects of 
federal control. In fact, the Saine interstate competitive dynamic that 
could, at least theoreticall)j generate a race to the bottom in envi-
ronmental is likely to produce the opposite in the 
context of crin1inallaw. The interjurisdictional race "cuts the oppo-
site as states benefit frmn increasing, not the strin-
gency of criininallaws. Whereas tightening economic regulations 
theoretically driving industry to other states, strengthening 
criininal codes and increasing law enforcen1ent, at least with respect 
Ducks Unlimited, Fact 
March 24, 200 l) 
Richard A. Epstein1 CnnstJtutimwl Fmt h and the Comnwr,~·e 
Dame L Rev 1671 lRO ( l Y96). 
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to violent or property crimes will, if anything, encourage tnore law-
u•J.L'-'-.I.U."- families to migrate to the state and encourage prospective 
criminals to migrate to other states with less stringent standards. 
By contrast, since the early 1970s, the federal governn1ent 
played an increasing role in addressing environmental concerns. In 
the wake of the first Earth Day, Congress enacted major statutes to 
address air and water quality, solid waste, drinking water, endan-
gered species, and abandoned hazardous waste sites. Whatever the 
other limits of federal authority, there is a pervasive belief that the 
federal government has a substantial role to play in addressing envi-
ronmental concerns. Rather than confront this belief the court rested 
its decision on statutory grounds. 
It is perfectly appropriate for the Court to avoid reaching unnec-
essary constitutional matters. In the case of the CWA, the statutory 
language was sufficiently opaque to resolve SWANCC on statutory 
grounds. This will not be so in the future. While Commerce Clause 
challenges to federal regulatory authority under the CWA may be 
off the table for the time being, challenges to other statutes are un-
der way. 
Perhaps the most likely area where the Court will be forced to 
confront the environmental challenge to federalism is the Endan-
gered Species Act (ESA). Under section 9(a)( 1) of the ESA, it is un-
lawful for any person to u take'' any species listed as 11 endangered" 
under the Act. To "take" a listed species tneans "to harass, harm, 
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt 
to engage in any such conduct. This prohibition applies on all 
private lands, and has the effect of requiring private landowners to 
provide habitat for endangered species. While those unfamiliar 
with the ESA might think that it primarily protects large, wide-
See Michael Greve, Why It Matters, How It Happen 
(AEI Press, 19991. 
The court also may be asked to revisit the limits of the CWA, as the Army 
Corps and EPA are construing the decision According to memoran-
dum issued EPA General Counsel Guzy and Army Corps Chief Counsel 
Robert M. Anderson shortly after the decision, the Court's holding lim-
ited to waters that arc intrastate.'/ 
memorandum/ any waters that fall outside arc still fair game. A copy 
of the memorandum on file with the author. 
16 USC~ 1538(a)(l). 
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ranging such as bald eagles, mountain lions, and 
most listed species are actually rather small species, n1any of 
which do not travel at all. Indeed, there are listed species that do 
not exist in 1nore than one state. 
Since there Con1merce Clause chal-
lenges to the application of the ESA's "take" prohibition to intra-
state including cases, like that involve activi-
ties and habitats that are completely contained within a given state. 
In Gibbs v. Babbitt, two North Carolina landowners and two coun-
ties challenged a federal plan to reintroduce red wolves in Dare and 
Tyrell Counties. By 1998, an estiinated 75 wolves were in the state. 
Although originally introduced on federal land, most were believed 
to be on private land. To support the reintroduction effort, the Fish 
and Wildlife Service promulgated regulations barring the "taking" 
of red wolves by private individuals. Violators are subject to both 
civil and criminal penalties. Plaintiffs challenged the federal 1'tak-
ing" regulations under the Commerce Clause. Regulating the cap-
ture or killing of wolves on private land, they contend, is not the 
regulation of commerce among the several states. The court never-
theless found that the killing of wolves to protect livestock or other 
animals and the potential revival of the 19th century practice of 
hunting wolves for their pelts related to commercial activities. 
These rationales for regulation would seem to press against the lin1-
its of the Commerce Clause as defined in Lopez and Morrison. 
National Association Home v. Babbitt 1s8 presented 
an even more questionable assertion of federal regulatory authority 
to protect endangered species. This case concerned federal efforts to 
protect the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, which was placed on the 
endangered species list in 1993. Federal prohibition on "taking" 
delayed construction of a hospital and local road improve-
Inents. Several trade associations and local governments launched 
a Commerce Clause challenge to this regulation because the habitat 
for the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly "is located entirely within 
214 E3d 483 (4th Cir 2000L cert denied, 121 
SO CFR 1 
16 USC lS40(a)-(b). 
Gibbs. 214 F3d at 495. 
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an eight mile radius in southwestern San Bernardino County and 
northwestern Riverside County, California." 161 
In both Gibbs and NAHB, divided circuit court panels upheld the 
federal regulation and the Supreme Court denied subsequent review. 
The regulatory scope of the ESA makes subsequent challenges likely, 
bringing the conflict between federal environmental regulation and 
federalism to bear. In the ESA context, there is no means to avoid 
the constitutional issue through an appeal to unclear statutory lan-
guage. Regulating activities that may harm endangered species on 
private land is not geographically limited in the way that Corps' reg-
ulation under section 404 is limited to "waters of the United States." 
If Lopez and Morrison are taken seriously, it will not be easy to 
distinguish the "taking" of wolves or flies on private land from the 
possession of a gun near a school. It is certainly true that the motiva-
tion for taking a wolf or a fly may be commercial, as when a rancher 
kills a wolf to protect livestock, or a developer destroys a fly while 
constructing a building. But it is equally true that one might have a 
commercial motive for possessing a gun near a school, as was the 
case in Lopez itself. The mere fact that one might have a commer-
cial motivation for violating a regulation cannot be enough to make 
it a regulation of interstate commerce. Nor does it seem that pre-
venting wolves and flies from being taken is "an essential part of a 
larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory 
scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regu-
lated." 16' The purpose of the ESA is to protect endangered species, 
not to regulate their economic use. 
Contrary to the fears of some, there is no more reason to think 
that restricting the application of the ESA must threaten protection 
of endangered species than that the outcmne in SWANCC need un-
dermine protection of wetlands. For example, states have an incen-
tive to act to capture tourism benefits from endangered species pop-
ulations. The interstate externalities of species protection are, if 
anything, less than those of wetlands protection, since wetlands or 
waters that are a part of a larger hydrological system pose the poten-
tial for generating transboundary spillovers of the sort that would 
justify federal regulation. Finally, insofar as species are a public 
good, they can be provided for in much the same 1nanner as wet-
NAIJB, L10 F3d 1043. 
States Lopez, F3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir 199:1) (stating that 
advised of his rights, Lopez stated that 1Gilbert' had him the gun 
could deliver it after school to 'Jason,' who to use it in 
war/ Lopez to receive $40 for "I. 
Lopez. 14 US at 561. 
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lands or waterfowl habitat through federal recourse to the spending 
power. 
CONCLUSION 
Environmental advocates view the Supren1e Court's interest 
in federalisn1 and enumerated powers with trepidation. Liiniting 
federal power, they fear, inevitably lirnits environn1ental protection. 
Yet the traditional arguments for federal involve1nent in n1any envi-
ronmental concerns lack theoretical or e1npirical support. 1s 
no need for federal regulation to prevent a "race to the bottom or 
to respond to every conceivable interstate externality. If the protec-
tion of environn1ental resources in1poses local costs hut truly na-
tional benefits, the spending power, not the commerce power1 is the 
appropriate tool to such problen1s. 
Should the Supren1e Court continue down its present path, it will 
inevitably confront the environmental implications of its federalist 
jurisprudence. There will not always be ambiguous statutory lan-
guage or smne other means to avoid addressing the environmentalist 
reservations about li1niting federal regulatory power. When such a 
case arises, the Court will have to respond. The Court need not turn 
its back on either its federalist principles or the nation's conserva-
tion heritage, for the two can be reconciled. When this lesson is 
learned, the environmental challenge to federalism will be met. 
